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Hydration, Nutrition, and Euthanasia: 
Legal Reflections on the 
Role of Church Teaching 
Dennis J. Horan, Esq. 
The author. a long-time member of the Linacre Quarterly editorial 
advisory board. died very suddenly several months ago. He was a staunch. 
articulate pro-life supporter from his Chicago la w office. He was a partner. 
Hinshaw. Culbertson. Moelmann. Hoban & Fuller. Chicago. Ill; 
chairman. Americans United for Life Legal Defense Fund. Mr. Horan 
gratefully acknowledged the substantial research and drafting assistance 
provided by Edward R . Grant. Esq .. executive director of Americans 
United for Life. 
Historians of society and of medicine will recognize the 1980s as the 
decade in which Americans first seriously considered whether euthanasia 
- the direct killing of patients by omission or overt act from a merciful or 
beneficient motive - ought to be legalized . The develoments they will cite 
in support of this thesis are well-known to us. Through the mass media , 
individuals such as Roswell Gilbert and Betty Rollin, who have committed 
acts of euthanasia , are praised for their courage. In academic circles , the 
burgeoning discipline of biomedical ethics consistently challenges the 
traditional moral and legal strictures against euthanasia. In law, we have 
seen, in the United States, court cases which permit the deliberate 
starvation of profoundly impaired patients who are not terminally ill. On 
the issue of euthanasia or mercy-killing, we clearly live in a history-making 
epoch. 
As we examine this history-in-the-making, and attempt to influence its 
course, critical attention must be given to the role of the Church. Our 
experience in advising churchmen as well as lawmakers on these issues has 
taught us that the influence of the Church may be more deeply felt in this 
area of public policy than in many others , such as economics or war and 
peace, where the role of the Church is more widely publicized. This high 
degree of influence derives from two critical factors: the centuries-old 
tradition of Catholic schola rship and moral teaching on medical ethics, 
and the role of the Church as a provider of hea lth care services. 
32 Linacre Quarterly 
The purpose of our paper is to examine the interplay between Church 
teaching and public policy on euthanasia by focusing on the current debate 
in the United States over the provision of nourishment to certain patient 
populations. We will begin with a brief overview of the legal status of this 
question , and then proceed to review the actions of the Church, acting 
through local ordinaries and episcopal conferences, as well as through 
individual theologians , on the formation of public policy. Finally, we will 
examine current writings of theologians who profess full support for the 
Church's traditional teaching against euthanasia , but who nevertheless 
accept the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration from non-terminally ill 
patients as within that teaching. We will argue that public policy will not be 
able to preserve the distinction that is drawn by these theologians between 
deliberate starvation of non-terminal patients, and more direct means of 
killing patients , and that the Church's moral teaching should take into 
account the need for clarity in the realm of public policy. 
I. Legal Issues Concerning Nutrition and Hydration 
A. The Emergence of the Nutrition and Hydration Issue 
Early cases involving the termination of medical treatment , such as 
those of Karen Quinlan I and Joseph Saikewicz2, did not reach the question 
of whether nourishment can be withdrawn from a patient, thus allowing 
the patient to die . The legal consensus emerging from these cases seemed to 
be in agreement with the teaching of Catholic moral theology that 
extraordinary and invasive means of therapy are not obligatory, 
particularly in the case of terminal illness. However, it was presumed that 
ordinary means of support, such as nourishment and warmth , would 
always be provided.) 
This view was first challenged in American law in 1982. In that year, 
murder charges were brought against two California physicians, 
Dr. Barber, and Dr. Nejdl, for their role in the death of a 55 year-old 
racetrack guard , Clarence Herbert. 4 Mr. Herbert had suffered cardiac 
arrest in the recovery room following surgery performed by Dr. Nejdl, and 
due to oxygen deprivation lasting several minutes , remained in a coma. 
Three days after this incident, the two doctors authorized the removal, 
with the family's permission, of M r. Herbert's mechanical ventilator. 
When the patient was able to breathe on his own, the doctors then 
approached the family and suggested that all life-support, including 
intravenous feeding, be halted. This was done, and the patient died a week 
later. 
In a 1983 decision, a California appellate court dismissed the homicide 
charges. 5 The court held that the use of intravenous feeding "is the same as 
the use of the respirator or other forms of life support equipment", and 
that there is no legal duty upon physicians to provide any such life support 
to a person in Mr. Herbert's condition. These holdings were remarkable, 
not only because they abruptly expanded the freedom of doctors to 
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remove life-sustaining treatment and nourishment from grievously-
impaired patients, but also because of the haste with which treatment was 
withdrawn in this particular case.6 
That same year - 1983 - also saw the issuance of the report of the 
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine on 
the termination of life-sustaining medical treatment. 7 This report 
recommended that the essential conclusions of the California appellate 
court be adopted in other legal jurisdictions: namely, that no distinction be 
drawn between tube feeding and other forms of life-sustaining treatment 
such as dialysis or ventilation. In the intervening years, culminating in five 
decisive opinions delivered in 1985 and 1986. American law has moved 
swiftly to accommodate this controversial recommendation of the 
President's Commission. 
1. In re Claire Conroy 
The New Jersey Supreme Court was also the first state supreme court to 
directly face the issue of whether nourishment may be withdrawn from a 
patient on the same basis as other forms of medical treatment. In the case 
of Claire Conroy8, the court held that medical treatment, including 
nourishment by "artificial" means , may be withheld from nursing home 
patients with a life expectancy of less than one year, provided that certain 
safeguards are met. First, it must be determined , if possible, whether the 
patient had left "clear and convincing" evidence regarding his or her 
preferences for medical treatment in such a situation. Second , the 
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment was to be approved by two 
independent physicians, a committee of the nursing home, and a state 
ombudsman for the elderly. Strong evidence suggests, however, that these 
safeguards are being disregarded , and thus, that the most effective aspect 
of the opinion is its holding that nourishment may be withdrawn on a par 
with other forms of medical treatment. 9 
2. Corbett, Jobes and Bouvia 
Subsequent cases support the thesis that the Conroy safeguards will be 
disposed, thus permitting the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration from 
a wider circle of patients , including those who are not terminally ill. In the 
case of Nancy Jobes, currently before the New Jersey Supreme Court, a 
trial court held that a feeding tube may be removed from a profoundly 
impaired nursing home patient, even though the court acknowledged that 
"if the feeding tube is removed , dehydration and starvation will follow, 
and Ms. Jobes will die."lo In the same month, April , 1986, appellate courts 
in two other states , Florida and California , held that no state interest is 
sufficient to override an impaired patient's decision to forego feeding. 
In the Florida case , Corbett v. D'Alessandro, an appellate court held 
that the right to have a nasogastric tube removed is a constitutionally-
protected right. II Thus, despite the fact that the Florida living will statute 
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did not include nutrition and hydration as treatment that the patient may 
direct to be withheld , a patient's proxy may nevertheless order these 
elements to be withheld . This is so because the living will statute may not 
override the now-incompetent patient's constitutional rights , and the 
exercise of those rights by the patient's proxy.J2 
The California decision , in the case of Elizabeth Bouvia 13, has gone the 
furthest of any American court in endorsing a right to euthanasia. The 
court decided that Ms. Bouvia could refuse assisted feeding on the grounds 
of the "indignity" of her life as a quadriplegic, needing the care of others for 
her basic needs. The court's attitude toward the value of human life is 
revealed in its description of Ms. Bouvia's existence. "She herself is 
imprisoned and must lie physically helpless subject to the ignominy, 
embarrassment, humiliation and dehumanizing aspects created by her 
helplessness . We do not believe it is the policy of this State that all and 
every life must be preserved against the will of the sufferer. It is 
incongruous, if not monstrous , for medical practitioners to assert their 
right to preserve a life that someone else must live, or, more accurately , 
endure, for 15 to 20 years."14 
One justice of this court went even further , holding that Ms. Bouvia has 
an absolute right to end her life, not merely through starvation, but by 
enlisting the direct intervention of the medical profession to kill her. "The'-
state and the medical profession instead of frustrating her desire, should be 
attempting to relieve her suffering by permitting and in fact assisting her to 
die with ease and dignity . . . . The right to die ... should, in my opinion, 
include the ability to enlist assistance from others, including the medical 
profession, in making death as painless and quick as possible."ls 
3. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital 
Finally, in September, 1986, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts ruled in the case of Paul Brophyl6 that a feeding tube may 
be withdrawn from a person in a persistent vegetative state when that 
person expressed a prior desire not to be kept alive in such a state. 
Although Brophy was not the first opinion to decide this question, it 
marked the first time that a judicial decision actually permitted the 
starvation death of a patient who had been alive at the time the decision 
was reached. The decision has more than the usual significance since the 
court agreed that Mr. Brophy was not in a terminal state, nor was death 
imminent from any medical cause, but that he would die as a result of the 
failure to feed. This acknowledgment was interpreted by some observers, 
including the three dissentingjustices, as tantamount to the legalization of 
assisted mercy-killing. These dissenting justices, all practicing Catholics, 
also suggested that once starvation of patients is accepted practice, the 
pressure will be overwhelming to approve the efficient and painless 
disposition of patients through injection and other direct means.17 
The decisions in Brophy and Bouvia, therefore , establish that the 
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debate over the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration is, in reality, a 
debate over the legitimacy of mercy-killing. Robert Destro, a professor of 
law at Catholic University of America and a member of the United States 
Civil Rights Commission, writes that the" 'food and water' issue must be 
seen for what it is: the entering wedge of an ethic which would permit 
intentional steps to end the lives of the disabled .. .. Once intentional steps 
to cause death - rather than passive measures which permit the condition 
or disease to take its natural course - have been approved, the inescapable 
conclusion is that it is the existence of the disabled person which 
constitutes the undesirable condition. The 'remedy' for certain disabilities 
under the functional ethic is death. Food and water - the basic 
requirements of life itself - are redefined as medical 'treatments' which 
can be withdrawn when the patient can no longer be made whole."1 8 This is 
clearly indicated by the court's holding in Brophy that the maintenance of 
Mr. Brophy "for a period of several years, is intrusive treatment as a malter 
of law."19 
II. Church Reaction to and Participation In 
The Formation of Current Policy 
The Church has played an influential role in the development of public 
policy which we have just briefly outlined . Involving the work of 
theologians, local ordinaries and state and national episcopal conferences, 
the contribution of the Church has been diverse and complex. As in the 
case of many other issues over recent decades, the presence of so many 
voices has raised the question of who authentically speaks for the Church 
on matters of medical morality. However, the lack of unity in the Church's 
teaching cannot be attributed solely to the number and variety of 
participants; it is a function likewise of evolutions in philosophy and 
strategy on the part of some of the most key participants. 
A. Court Testimony by Theologians 
Several Catholic priests have testified in the court cases on the issue of 
providing nutrition and hydration, claiming to offer the perspective of 
Church teaching. Rev. John Paris, S.l., of Holy Cross College in 
Massachusetts, has been the most active priest-witness. He testified for 
two days on behalf of Drs. Barber and Nejdl at the preliminary hearing 
held in connection with the homicide charges brought against them. 
Father Paris also testified in favor of the withdrawal of feeding tubes from 
those patients in a persistent vegetative state in the Brophy and Jobes 
trials. In Conroy, Rev. 10seph Kukura , a professor in medical ethics at a 
diocesan seminary, testified in favor of removing the nasogastric feeding 
tube . Rev. 10hn Connery, S.J., offered an opposing perspective in the 
Brophy case , and his testimony was cited approvingly by the trial court 
judge who refused the family's request to permit the cessation of feeding. 
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B. U.S.c.c. Statements 
The United States Catholic Conference, and the committee on Pro-Life 
Activities of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, has tended to 
side with the position expressed by Father Connery. These groups have 
not participated in litigation, but have commented frequently upon 
various legislative proposals concerning the provision of medical 
treatment to the terminally ill. The Conference has taken the position that 
legislation protecting a limited right to refuse medical treatment, and to 
write an advance directive to be used in the event of incompetency, is 
permissible. However, the Conference has stated that such legislation must 
exclude nutrition and hydration from the categories of medical treatment 
which may be withdrawn under a so-called "living will".20 
C. Experience of New Jersey Catholic Conference 
As in the case of abortion, however, it is the courts, not the legislatures , 
which appear to have the strongest role in staking out the fundamental 
direction for the law on this issue. Courts are forced to deal with the 
particulars of difficult , complex cases, and they are better prepared than 
legislatures to deal with the ethical and legal nuances of the problem. This 
is not to advertise a "judicial supremacist" approach to the issue, but 
simply to recognize an important reality in the formation of public policy. 
This has particularly been so , for reasons of historical accident, in the 
state of New Jersey, home of the Quinlan, Conroy and Jobes cases referred 
to earlier. In examining the role of the Church in affecting public policy, 
and the way this teaching role may be influenced by events outside of the 
Church, we can study the role of the New Jersey Catholic Conference in 
each of these three cases. 
In Quinlan, the Conference brief consisted of a statement of instruction 
to the faithful of the Paterson diocese which, employing the Church's 
traditional distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means, 
supported the position of the Quinlan family. 21 While reiterating the 
Church's prohibition of euthanasia or mercy-killing, the Conference brief 
submitted that the withdrawal of Karen Quinlan's respirator did not 
violate this prohibition. It is apparent in reading the Supreme Court's 
opinion, written by Chief Justice Richard J. Hughes, (also a Catholic) , 
that the Court took no small comfort from the Church's statements in this 
regard. 
In Conroy , the Conference brief did not take a position on whether 
withdrawal of the feeding tube would be ethically appropriate in that 
particular case. 22 The brief consisted of several Church statements 
concerning euthanasia and the prolongation of life , and introductory 
material urging the applicability of these principles to society at large. 
However, the brief could not have been particularly helpful to the Court in 
determining how these principles ought to be applied . Moreover, the brief 
avoided the essential question presented by the opinion of the lower 
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appellate court that was under review. That lower court had rejected 
removal of the feeding tube on grounds that it would constitute euthanasia 
and thus offend public policy. 23 While the Conference condemned 
euthanasia and medical treatment decisions based on the "quality of life", 
it offered no support for the position of the appellate court. Rather, the 
Conference brief expressed concern that the court's firm stance on public 
policy would unduly restrict medical practice, the firm stance on public 
policy grounds taken by the appellate court. "We cannot impress upon the 
Court more strongly the caution that in an attempt to resolve a question 
which may be simply stated, we do not overly restrict the judgment of 
medical decision-makers by trying to judicially decide what this Court may 
perceive to be public policy."24 
In the Jobes case, however, the Bishops' Conference submitted a brief 
very different from those in Quinlan and Conroy . For the first time, the 
Conference explicitly recognized the distinction between personal ethical 
judgments and the formation of public policy, and endorsed the view that 
the interests of public policy should, where appropriate, take precedence. 
"[W]e ask the Court not to look favorably on a plea for sanctioning 
starvation as a means of death for a patient who would not otherwise die 
immediately. In this we make no ethical judgment of the plaintiff. Indeed 
we can understand their [sic] motivation. Our emphasis , rather, is that the 
corporate conscience of the nursing home reflects traditional public policy 
which has brought us our laws against aiding suicide and euthanasia, and 
has resulted in the type of patient care which balances duty and benefits to 
society against a spurious 'right to die' and relief from burdens sustained 
regularly by a multitude of suffering but non-terminal patients across the 
nation. The Conference maintains that nutrition and hydration, being 
basic to human life, are aspects of normal care, which are not excessively 
burdensome, that should always be provided to a patient."25 
D. Lessons from the New Jersey Cases 
We do not mean to single out the work of the New Jersey Bishops' 
Conference, but to consider it as an example of the difficult process in 
which the Church is now engaged: to be faithful to her moral tradition, 
while helping to prevent a public policy which favors mercy-killing. If, as 
the Conference brief in Conroy submits , the teaching of the Church is 
applicable to all of society, then the Church must in turn consider in the 
formulation of its own statements the decisive nature of the trends in 
public policy which are now emerging. This imperative applies to bishops, 
theologians, and all who aim to speak in the name of the Church's moral 
tradition. In formulating Church teaching, it is no longer adequate to 
focus entirely upon the obligations of an individual patient to accept or 
reject certain forms of medical treatment. The question facing the arbiters 
of public policy is somewhat different: the responsibility of society to care 
for those no longer able to care for themselves. As we see in many facets 
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of life, the trend is very strong to diminish those responsibilities . The 
success of this trend within the medical and nursing professions , which 
have traditionally been devoted to zealous protection ofthe welfare ofthe 
individual patient, could be disastrous. 
It is apparent from reviewing the last 35 years of Catholic literature on 
the subject, that we cannot expect a clear consensus from our moralists on 
the question of whether mechanical means of feeding a patient over an 
indefinite period of time constitute an extraordinary means of treatment. 26 
However, we must recognize, as the New Jersey Catholic Conference has 
in its Jobes brief, that far more is at stake than the content of Catholic 
moral teaching. In the interest of maintaining a public policy which 
prohibits the deliberate starvation of patients with the intent and effect of 
bringing about their deaths , or the legalization of assisted suicide, we will 
have to subordinate our interest in making these judgments solely under 
the guidance of Catholic moral teaching. We may feel confident that our 
own institutions will only permit the withdrawal of feeding in morally 
appropriate cases, and will never slide into the widespread practice of 
starvation, and then, active means of euthanasia. But it would be utterly 
naive for us to believe that public policy will follow a similar course. 
This is demonstrated by another case from New Jersey, Matter of 
Requena, in which a Catholic hospital was required by both a trial and 
appellate court, against its formally-stated objection, to remove a feeding 
tube from a patient with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, who had requested 
it to be removed, and permit her to starve to death. The trial court 
criticized the ethical objections of the hospital as being improperly 
judgmental of the patient's intentions , and too zealously "pro-life".27 The 
court also criticized the failure of the hospital to consult the views of the 
treating physicians, who accepted Mrs . Requena's decision. Admittedly, 
the case of a conscious patient, afflicted with terminal illness and near 
death, who requests not to be fed, is the most difficult situation in which to 
insist that feeding be continued . Indeed, if death is imminent, such a 
decision may be appropriate. But Requena remains a compelling reminder 
that the currents of public policy are moving, swiftly and powerfully, to 
alter the practice of medicine even within Catholic health care institutions. 
III. Observations on Current Trends in Catholic Thought 
A. The Current Threat in Public Policy 
The public policy against euthanasia is embodied in the laws of 
homicide, which have, for centuries, refused to create an exemption for 
killings carried out with a "compassionate" motive. Other areas of the law, 
notably those dealing with the provision of medical treatment, have 
respected this policy. The rationale for the policy is the equality and 
intrinsic value of human life , as well as the need for trust and confidence 
that all citizens are bound to respect the lives of others. The creation of 
even narrow exceptions to this policy would be fatal to the entire policy, 
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for it would create arbitrary criteria of physiological and intellectual 
fitness which must be met in order to qualify for the protection of the law. 
The promise that we will not kill each other, a fundamental axiom of our 
society, will be lost, for each of us may one day fall into one of the 
categories of life - be it terminal illness, persistent coma, or other 
disability - which is exempt from the law's absolute protection against 
killing.28 
The public policy against mercy-killing does not, and has never, 
required that all efforts be used in every case to sustain life, particularly 
when such efforts are useless, as in the case of imminent death . It is when 
decisions are made to withdraw the non-burdensome sustenance of life, 
food and water, with the intent of causing death , that this policy is 
offended. As the courts recognized in the Jobes and Brophy cases, the 
patients are not terminally ill and could live with tube feeding for many 
years. The effort to remove their feeding tubes is simply meant to hring 
about their deaths . As the New Jersey Catholic Conference stated in its 
Jobes brief, one may have sympathy for the family in this situation, but 
one must also keep a clear head about the radical consequences for public 
policy of permitting a family to order that one of its members be starved to 
death. 
B. Current Catholic Teaching and Public Policy 
Less than a year ago (Mar. 1986), in a paper delivered at St. Francis 
Hospital in Miami Beach, I noted a disquieting trend among some 
Catholic theologians on the subject of withdrawing nutrition and 
hydration.29 I suggested that these moralists ought to weigh their 
comments more carefully in light of the volatile developments in public 
policy which were then occurring. Since that time, events have moved 
swiftly in the direction of permitting withdrawal of nourishment. The 
decisions in Jobes, Bouvia, and Brophy, as well as others we have not 
mentioned here, have. all been issued in the past year. In addition, the 
Judicial Council of the American Medical Association has endorsed the 
removal of food and fluids from patients who are permanently comatose 
or in a persistent vegetative state. 30 During this time, we have seen a 
continuation of the trend among Catholic moralists to approve the 
withdrawal of nourishment in these cases, while attempting to maintain 
their opposition to direct means of killing patients. 
However valid this distinction between the starvation and the direct 
killing of patients may be on grounds of moral theology, it is not valid and 
will not be respected within the realm of public policy. The writings of 
Catholic moralists have largely ignored the potential consequences for 
public policy of cases such as Jobes and Brophy. They assume that public 
policy will be able to maintain the fine distinction between the withdrawal 
of feeding and the injection of a lethal agent. We believe this assumption 
has been proven wrong already in the opinion of the Bouvia case, where the 
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court endorsed deliberate starvation as a means of euthanasia, and 
suggested t hat the law should also permit more painless and efficient 
means of euthanasia. Furthermore, if the public sees that it is permissible 
to starve patients in the condition of Karen Quinlan, Paul Brophy, and 
Nancy Jobes , it will demand the same liberty for other patients whom 
families and society find difficult to care for. Parties will be able to argue 
under the principle of equality that the "right" not to be fed cannot be 
limited to a narrow category of patients. Finally, to most common sense 
observers, the only logical alternative to the grotesque manner of dying 
which results from starvation would be to perform active euthanasia and 
kill the patient instantly. Many will argue that it is more humane to kill 
painlessly than to cause the additional prolonged agony of death by 
starvation. 
Many Catholic moralists have not only ignored the public policy 
consequences of these decisions , but have also offered rationales fof the 
withdrawal of nourishment which will further undermine the public policy 
against euthanasia. In Catholic teaching, the analysis of extraordinary 
versus ordinary means has often focused on the burdensomeness and 
invasiveness of treatment. Judged by these criteria, nutrition and 
hydration, even by tube , would fall into the category of ordinary 
treatment. As found by the trial court in the Brophy case, the feeding of a 
patient through a nasogastric tube or gastrostomy tube, is neither invasive, 
burdensome, or painful. In justifying the removal of feeding, therefore, 
moralists have shifted their focus to subjective factors such as "quality of 
life" and the "psychological repugnancy" of feeding. Although the 
objective, physical burdens upon a patient remain a part of the moralists' 
analysis , it is clear that the question turns upon the degree to which the 
physiological and neurological condition of the patient may justify a 
cessation of all efforts to sustain life - even feeding and hydration. 
An Intriguing Formulation 
One of the more intriguing formulations of this standard is that of Rev. 
Kevin O' Rourke, O.P., which states that in the absence of cognitive-
affective function, there is no duty to preserve life because the ability to 
pursue the purposes of life - love of God and neighbor, happiness , 
relationships - does not exisPI Father O' Rourke should not be singled 
out, because his position is echoed by a number of other leading moralists . 
In a review of current teaching published in Health Progress, Rev. James 
J . McCartney, O.S .A., concludes: "Catholic teaching is not opposed to the 
withholding or withdrawal of artificial sustenance when, in the patient's 
view, this intervention becomes physically, emotionally, or spiritually too 
difficult to bear, either for the patient or others."32 Father McCartney 
suggests that the problem of incompetent patients should be resolved by 
oral or written "living wills" delivered to a trusted family member or friend. 
Rev. Richard McCormick, S.J. , has written that the care of the comatose 
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may be resolved by terming such patients to be in a "terminal state" - even 
though their life expectancy is indefinite. 33 
Leslie Rothenberg, a non-Catholic attorney and medical ethicist at the 
University of Southern California, has written that these statements of 
Catholic theologians will have an undoubted impact on the formation of 
public policy, and whether intended to or not, will assist the cause of 
legalizing euthanasia. 34 Rothenberg's insight is not hard to grasp, for much 
of the language employed by the moralists seems virtually indistinguishable 
from that authored by the proponents of euthanasia. "Much of this 
debate," he writes, "centers on whether one views the death of such 
patients as a benefit . . . or their continued survival as a burden. 
Discussions of such concepts, as well as those of a 'benefit-burden calculus' 
or the test of 'cognitive-affective function' could actually place the 
statements of Catholic theologians and those of euthanasia proponents in 
close proximity. Fr. [Thomas] O'Donnell has acknowledged this concern, 
noting that the characterization of artificial nutrition and hydration as 
extraordinary means of preserving life in some cases is 'likely to be seized 
by proponents of euthanasia, and ever-so-slight distortions may be 
presented as Catholic authority for their euthanasia propaganda.' "35 
It may not be sufficient, however, for Catholic moralists to simply 
acknowledge the danger that their teaching will be misapplied to justify 
practices which neither they nor the Church would endorse. These 
theologians are consciously aware of the developments in public policy on 
the nutrition and hydration issue; indeed, their current writings are in 
direct response to events such as the Brophy decision and the AMA policy 
on withdrawing nutrition. While the theologians may be firm in their 
stance against direct lethal intervention, the society and medical profession 
which they seek to instruct is not. Public opinion polls suggest that over 60 
percent of Americans favor active mercy-killing in an unspecified range of 
cases. A society so disposed will not accept the fine distinction that 
theologians and other commentators now draw between the removal of 
nourishment, and more direct means of bringing about the death of 
patients. 
Although Catholic moralists have strongly denied this, what is 
occurring, in fact , in cases such as Jobes and Brophy, is the purposeful 
death-by-design of severely impaired patients through the means of 
starvation. These deaths involve patients who are not in pain, are not 
terminally ill, and , due to insurance coverage, are not a financial burden 
upon their families. The more compelling cases for euthanasia will arise 
when the factors of pain, terminal illness and financial burden are present . 
Witness the recent story in Life magazine describing an aging couple's 
systematic hoarding of prescribed drugs in order to commit suicide. 36 The 
argument will follow that since it is permissible for certain non-terminally 
ill patients to starve to death, then it should be permissible for other, more 
desperate, patients to die quickly and painlessly through lethal injection. A 
referendum proposing this alternative is now being sponsored by the 
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Hemlock Society, and may appear on the ballot in California as soon as 
1988.37 
IV. Reconciling Catholic Teaching and the Needs of Public Policy 
Catholic teaching, therefore, must take account oftwo factors which do 
not receive adequate discussion in the current writings of theologians. 
First, it must recognize the difference between the moral responsibility of 
an individual patient to accept life-sustaining treatment, and the duty of 
society to enact just laws to prevent the neglect and killing of patients. The 
nuances and ambiguities which are often acceptable in positions of moral 
theology, may cause confusion in the arena of public policy. Furthermore, 
they may lead to results in policy which are absolutely inimical to the 
central tenets of Church teaching. Second, Church teaching must more 
explicitly recognize a phenomenon of modern society which is often 
termed the "slippery slope". As Prof. Arthur Dyck of Harvard University 
has written, once euthanasia is permitted in a small number of cases, it will 
gradually be applied to a many others, because there is no way to limit the 
principle which allows mercy killing to a narrow range of cases definitely 
circumscribed and carefully controlled.38 Is the case for euthanasia 
stronger in the case of the comatose patient who may not sense his 
condition, or in the case of an Elizabeth Bouvia or Ida Rollin who suffer 
constant pain? The principle of equality under law would seem to demand 
that all patients who claim unbearable suffering be permitted, whether by 
their own volition or through a surrogate, to end their lives. Thus, as in the 
case of abortion, to open the door and legalize mercy killing in one case in 
modern, democratic societies is to legalize it in a full range of cases which 
are never contemplated by the progenitors of the policy.39 
For these reasons, what appear to be even small inroads against the law's 
prohibition of euthanasia should be firmly resisted . The Church will aid 
this resistance if it continues to recognize that it is permissible for the law to 
dra w a stricter standard governing the provision of medical treatment than 
might appear mandatory in the realm of moral theology. There should be 
nothing startling about this proposal. At stake in the realm of moral 
theology is not only the preservation of Catholic doctrine, but the 
counseling and nurturing of individual souls. In order for this benefit to be 
available to all believers in all strata of society, teachers of moral theology 
must take into account a wide variety of circumstances, and must avoid the 
error of unduly burdening the consciences of the faithful. 
The makers of public policy must take into account a similarly-wide 
range of circumstances. But the stakes are much different. Law must guide 
and regulate human conduct, and to do this effectively it must, on 
occasion, draw sharp lines. Even if theologians prefer not to focus their 
lines with the same degree of clarity, they must be aware of the 
consequences if the law fails to do so. This is particularly true if 
theologians are to continue in their role of advising the courts and 
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legislatures on acceptable public policy in this area. 
Where should the public policy line be drawn on nutntlOn and 
hydration? Because the removal of these elements will inevitably bring 
about death in every case, the law should not permit their removal unless a 
patient is imminently dying, or the means of providing nourishment are 
ineffective or actually harmful to the patient. The 1986 statement of the 
AMA Judicial Council would add another category: the permanently 
comatose or "vegetative" patients. 4o The reasons this addition by the A MA 
should be vigorously resisted are set forth by the trial judge in the Brophy 
case, who refused to order the removal of the feeding tube. "A society 
which rejects euthanasia, the selective killing of the unfit , the insane, the 
retarded and the comatose patient is morally obliged to sustain the life of 
an ill human being, even one in a persistent vegetative state, provided that 
in the process of sustaining his life, he is not subjected to treatment which is 
highly invasive or burdensome, and which causes him extreme discomfort 
or pain."41 As Judge Kopelman recognized , thousands and perhaps 
millions of persons in society have lost the capacity for "cognitive-affective 
function" relied upon by some commentators as a valid criterion for 
relinquishing all efforts to sustain life. His duty, and the duty of all judges 
and legislators, is to protect the life and the rights of these powerless 
citizens. All who share this interest would do well to follow the vision of 
Judge Kopelman, who saw in the tragic circumstances of Paul Brophy's 
condition a challenge to the most fundamental values of our legal system. 
When the Church teaches in the area of medical morality and ethics, it 
must give credence to these fundamental values, and also recognize that, in 
modern society, they are very fragile indeed. 
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